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1. 
This paper analyses the South African government's policies towards 
unemployed blacks
1
 between 1984 and 1987. These policies are viewed as 
a prime example of the apartheid state's political posturing in the 
post-Soweto decade. Efforts to alleviate black unemployment in the mid-
1980' s, following a history of intransigence on the issue, were not 
motivated by any sense of altruism but by the popular misperception that 
any upsurge in political violence, such as South Africa experienced 
in the mid-1980's, is related to unemployment. This argument explains 
the contradiction between the admitted failure of the government's 
policies to reduce unemployment and the pronounced success of the same 
policies. 'Success' had nothing to do with unemployment per se but with 
the reproduction of a docile and guiescent black population. 
UNEMPLOYMENT, THE RADICAL POOR AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
"We are not fighting those who want orderly change ... 
we are fighting the revolutionaries and those terror-
ist organizations who believe in violence, intimi-
dation and war. We are ... committed to reform in 
every sphere of national life ... It is the govern-
ment's policy to fight unemployment. We want to 
create more jobs ... to promote the establishment of 
a strong middle class among the black population." 
D. M. Streicher, MP (National Party), 1987
2 
This guote reflects a popular perception of what could be called the 
myth of the radical unemployed: a powerful fallacy linking unemployment 
to political instability. The perception is based on the belief that the 
unemployed are revolutionaries, particularly those who inhabit the 
shanty accretions of third world cities. It is almost as though people 
choose to live in such dire circumstances with the express purpose of 
fomenting revolution. These fears have been given credibility by 
variants of the socio-economic chanqe political violence thesis. The 
basic assumption here is that rapid urbanization leads to social 
dislocation, or alienation, which increases susceptibility to political 
mobilization and radicalization. In this sense, unemployment is a form 
of social dislocation. Frantz Fanon, for example, in his book The 
2. 
Wretched of the Earth suggested: 
"It is within this mass of humanity, this people of 
the shanty towns, at the core of the lumpen-
proletariat that the rebellion will find its urban 
spearhold. For the lumpenproletariat, that horde 
of starvinq men ... constitutes one of the most 
spontaneous and most radically revolutionary 
forces . 
Notwithstanding the general failure of the "wretched of the earth" to 
mobilize the oppressed and an increasing array of evidence suggesting 
that unemployed shanty dwellers are the least politicized fraction of 
the urban population, the myth persists.
4
 In South Africa the illusion 
of unemployed radicals has a long tradition and constantly resurfaces."* 
The reappearance of this myth in the mid-1980's sets the stage for this 
paper: it is critical to explaining why unemployment became an issue in 
government circles. Later sections of this paper will analyse the 
peculiar strategies deployed by the apartheid state to alleviate 
unemployment and evaluate the 'success' of those strategies. 
POST-SOWETO ECONOMIC POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Although unemployment steadily increased during the 1970's, as a 
consequence of the capitalization of production in the 1960's and 1970's 
and manifestations of apartheid ideology, such as the Environmental 
Planninq Act which suppressed iob creation in 'white' urban areas, job 
reservation legislation, and bantu education,
6
 little attention was paid 
to the problem before the mid-1980's. A number of reasons explain this 
anomaly. 
First, unemployment amonq Africans, the sector most affected by 
unemployment was, and remains, heavily disquised. Accordinq to the 
Minister of Manpower the "only official unemployment statistics are 
those released by the Central Statistical Services" (CSS). CSS fiqures 
however, only include people who voluntarily reqister as unemployed in 
an attempt to be placed in a iob or, if they qualify, to receive 
unemployment benefits. Most importantly, these figures exclude 
3. 
unemployment in the bantustans and the subsistence agricultural sector. 
The result is a grossly distorted picture. In January 1987, for example, 
when most analysts were calculating black unemployment in the four to 
six million range (see below) the CSS 'concocted' a figure of 1.05 
million.® 
Second, the white electorate is essentially unaffected by the misery of 
unemployment in two senses. Artificially high levels of white employment 
have been achieved by absorbing poorly educated and unskilled elements 
into the public service and parastatals, often at the expense of better 
qualified black people. Nattrass, in fact, points out that in the past 
decade African employment as a percentage of public sector employment 
9 
has decreased while the white proportion has increased. For example, 
the number of urban whites working for the qovernment increased from 20 
percent in mid-1984 to 22 percent durinq 1985,
1 0
 and by June 1986 it was 
estimated that nearly 30 percent of economically active whites were 
working for the government or related public sector bodies.'^ Also the 
Group Areas Act physically removes the ravages of unemployment and 
poverty from view: a case of out of sight out of mind. 
Ttie first indication of concern about unemployment expressed by the 
National Party appeared at the end of 1979 when the Economic Advisory 
12 
Council (EAC) and the National Manpower Commission (NMC) began an 
investigation into the problem. Over the followinq three years the 
EAC/NMC devised a general strategy to reduce unemployment and submitted 
its recommendations at the beqinning of 1983. The government 
subsequently released a White Paper, A Strategy for the Creation of 
Employment Opportunities in South Africa, the following year. Tn its 
White Paper the government said that "any strategy for the creation of 
employment opportunities should be developed within the framework of a 
market orientated economic system and should therefore be based as much 
as possible on the role of the private sector".^ Furthermore, the 
government "reaffirmed its confidence in private initiative" and its 
"commitment to the promotion of small business including the informal 
14 
sector". Nonetheless, in tune with the EAC/NMC's recommendations the 
government agreed to initiate and sponsor a range of labour intensive 
projects such as low cost housing, home industries, and the construction 15 and maintenance of infrastructure such as roads, dams and schools. 
4. 
What, then, prompted the government to reverse its economic priorities 
and shift its focus to unemployment and, moreover, adopt subsidized 
labour intensive projects? Two interrelated reasons are advanced here: 
first, there was an increasing awarenenss of the magnitude of 
unemployment: and, second, unemployment was perceived as facilitating 
the upsurge in political violence. Let us examine these arguments. 
The Dimensions of Unemployment 
During the mid-1980's a series of well publicized research findings 
revealed the following: 
* unemployment among Africans was in the ranqe 4 800 000 - 5 250 000
1 6 
which represented up to 25 percent of the total African population or 
48 percent of the economically active African population:
17 
* approximately 50 percent of African school leavers in the urban areas 
1 8 
were unable to find work of any kind: 
* up to 70 percent of the potential economically active population in 
19 
the bantustans were without work: 
* the average period of unemployment among African men and women was 
20 
five years and seven months- and, 
* some ten million jobs will have to be created in the perid 1980 -
2000 in South Africa if new entrants to the labour market are to be 
accommodated and unemployment eliminated. Moreover, "this target has 
little chance of being fulfilled: between 1970 and 1980, which was a 
decade of prosperity, an average of only 172 000 jobs were created 
21 annually just over half the guantity reguired. 
Nor was the problem confined to the African sector of the population. 
Registered unemployment among Indians, coloureds and whites (elements of 
the former two sectors havinq been co-opted into an alliance with the 
Nationalists under the auspices of the tricameral parliament) more than 
doubled between mid-1984 and mid-1985 from 29 475 to 67 127.
2 2
 The 
publication of these statistics coincided with a high profile media 
23 campaign which focused on the plight of hungry white school children. 
5. 
Further, in the mid-1980's the physical seqreqation of the urban poor 
was increasingly difficult to enforce, particularly after the passing of 
the Abolition of Influx Control Act in 1986 which repealed some laws 
relating to the movement of Africans to, and within, urban areas. For 
example, the repeal of Section 29 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolid-
ation Act reduced the State's power to banish from the cities "idle and 
undesirable" Africans.
2 4
 Thus, the urban poor were becoming increasingly 
visible in traditional 'white' domains which undoubtedly contributed to 
the misperception that they were more difficult to police. 
Political Violence in the 1980'e 
The freguency and distribution of political violence in South Africa has 
increased markedly since the national boycott of schools in 1980. For 
example, in 1980 465 incidents were recorded, in 1981 171, 1982 110, 
1983 222, 1984 712 and for the first seven months of 1985 (1 January to 
25 
21 July) 1 419. The number of official deaths resultinq from political 
violence increased from 149 during 1984 to 824 in 1985 and casualties 
26 
from 651 to 2 615. While the government apportioned the blame for 
increasing violence on "the South African Communist Party-African 
National Congress alliance", "urbanization and socio-economic factors" 
27 
were also highlighted, thus firmly establishing the link between 
unemployment and political violence and necessitating the need for 
positive action. 
In South Africa the state has long defined social relationships in terms 
of race and imposed a set of objective material inequalities commen-
surate with those relationships. In the post-Soweto decade, these social 
relationships and objective inegualities have materialized in a 
dialectic between resistance and containment. Black resistance is about 
the attainment of equality in a non-racial democracy: government con-
tainment is about the retention of power and entails concessions, in the 
form of co-optation and social reform, and overt repression where 
demands for eguality are perceived as a threat to 'law and order' . 
Within this model, strategies to reduce unemployment and encourage the 
development of a black middle class are entirely compatible with 
co-optation and social reform policy. 
As a part of this policy the government began pouring money into 
6. 
economic relief packages.. In an initial response to the EAC/NMC's 
28 
recommendations the government allocated RIO million for job creation 
and training programs in the 1983/84 budget and a further R18 million 
was provided in 1984/85. However, following the release of its White 
Paper in 1984 the government allocated R100 million in the 1985/86 
budget and in September 1985, no doubt spurred on by thoughts of hungry 
white schoolchildren and the spectre of five by-elections in the (white) 
House of Assembly in October, an additional R500 million was provided 
for a range of projects. Barely five months later R90 million was 
allocated in the 1986/87 budget for short term job creation programs and 
R75 million for training unemployed persons. In another special package 
in June 1986 a further R50 million was made available. 
Concomitant with these measures the government reappraised its 
previously hostile attitude towards the informal sector and committed 
itself to its 'development' as a means of alleviating unemployment. The 
promotion of the informal sector has been primarily perceived in terms 
of removing restrictive legislation and providing capital to entre-
preneurs. For example, in his opening address to parliament in 1986, the 
State President spoke of the need to deregulate small business, 
including the informal sector, and later that year he was empowered 
under the Temporary Removal of Restictions on Economic Activities Act 
(TRREA) to abrogate laws or regulations which impede job creation or 
economic growth. A number of organizations such as the Small Business 
Development Corporation (SBDC), the Competition Board, the Urban 
Foundation and the Free Market Foundation (FMF) subsequently began 
investigating deregulation and streamlining restrictive and antiguated 
legislation. Consistent with the philosophy of providing loans to small 
operators, parastatals, such as the SBDC, and bantustan development 
corporations were founded during the 1980's. 
In the following section we will analyse the bankruptcy of the job 
creation and training programs and the strategy of developing the 
informal sector. Here, however, a critical contradiction in the 
government's appraisal of these strategies must be noted. On the one 
hand, "there are still considerable numbers of unemployed" as the 
Minister of Finance, Barend Du Plessis, put it when presentinq his 
1987/88 budqet. In contradistinction, he has also noted the success of 
these strategies: 
7. 
"That our efforts in reqard (to job creation) have 
(borne) fruit is evident from the very encouraqinq 
results emerqinq from the special traininq and iob 
creation programs and from the significant proqress 
achieved ir> the sphere of small business development. 
We also look for a further upsurqe in the informal 
sector ... as the deregulation process gathers 
29 momentum." 
In the 1987/88 budget assistance to the unemployed was slashed by 35 
percent from R235 million to R181.4 million for employment creation (new 
allocation R100 million) and training programs (R81.4 million).
3
® 
(Although slightly more money was allocated in the 1987/88 budqet than 
in 1986/87 much of the money allocated in the 1985 special packaqe was 
spent in the 1986/87 financial year.) Moreover, the government made it 
clear that responsibility for the creation of job opportunities "rested 
with the private sector". "State assistance", Du Plessis said in his 
budget speech, "can thus only be justified in exceptional circum-
stances."
31
 In other words, the 1987 budget reinforced the government's 
position adopted in the 1984 White Paper, A Strategy for the Creation of 
Employment Opportunities. By the government's reasoning, state sponsored 
job creation and training programs adopted between 1984 and 1987 were 
merely a temporary deviation from the commitment to: 
"Firstly, the development of the modern sector ... as 
the pivot of economic progress. Secondly, ... inward 
industrialization - that is, a process of economic 
growth generated internally as a result of the 
increasing demand for basic goods and services from a 
burgeoning urban population. Third ... regional 
32 
development." 
But, how could the government logically resolve such a blatant contra-
diction between failure and success? In answering this guestion one must 
understand what the government really means by the term 'success' . 
Before proceeding with this analysis we must first examine the reasons 
why the unemployment relief strategies failed so dismally. 
EMPLOYMENT CREATION STRATEGIES: A CRITIQUE 
The cornerstones of the government's unemployment relief measures are 
iob creation projects and training schemes for the unemployed. In 
addition the government concomitantly committed itself to the 'develop-
ment' of the informal sector. These strategies are examined in turn. 
Job Creation Programs 
According to the Minister of Manpower, the primary objective of the job 
creation program is to create the greatest number of temporary employ-
ment opportunities without discouraging people from seeking permanent 
employment or diverting them away from other economic activities, 
"however inadequate they might be, for example in subsistence 
agriculture or the informal sector".'''
1
 The fact that apartheid legis-
lation, such as the Group Areas Act and Mines and Works Act
3 5
 continues 
to restrict employment oppcrtunites appears to have escaped the 
Minister. 
Participants in the program are given an 'allowance' of R3 per day in 
rural areas and R4 per day in urban areas. This is considered 
"sufficient to provide a worker and his immediate family with one meal a 
day" and, perhaps more important, high enough to dissuade a person from 
"optinq to make a livinq by more dubious means". In terms of the 
conditions of this program, project sponsors in rural areas receive R6 
per worker per day and those in urban areas R8 per worker per day. Thus, 
one half of the funds allocated to each project is used to pay the 
'allowance' and the other half to finance administrative, transport, 
material, equipment and supervision costs. Only unemployed persons who 
37 
are not receiving unemployment insurance fund (UTF) benefits are 
eligible to join the program while preference is given to one member 
from each family. 
Individual job creation projects are administered as public works 
programs by various government departments (for example, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs administers projects in the 'independent' bantustans) 
and city and town authorities via their relevant provincial administra-
tions, and as labour-intensive projects by the private sector. Between 
April 1985 and 30 June 1987, 73 479 505 man days were worked on the job 
9. 
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creation program, of which 4 309 050 were administered by the private 
40 
sector under the auspices of the Department of Manpower. 
These figures may appear impressive but with closer analysis pale 
into insignificance. Although the national co-ordinator of the iob 
creation program claims that no statistics have been kept of the number 
of people who have received assistance,
4
^ assuming a total of 520 work-
ing days in this period then we can at least establish the ranqe; for 
example, 141 307 people employed for 520 days. Given the temporary 
nature of the projects (see below), a realistic assessment would be in 
the order of 825 000 people each employed for approximately four months. 
Evaluation of 'success' should, of course, take into consideration other 
factors such as the quality of jobs created. Abedian and Standish in 
fact point out that "there exists a modus operandi around which (public 
works) programs should be structured".
4
^ Unfortunately, the South 
African government has devised its own 'rules' which deviate in nearly 
every respect from the well documented principles. Analysis of South 
Africa's 'rules' exposes the bankruptcy of its policies. 
One of the principles of the public works program stipulated by the 
government is that projects must be temporary and able to be curtailed 
43 
at very short notice. Under such conditions, not only is job security 
non-existent but there is no net gain to the economy in terms of the 
total number of jobs available. Lewis, for example, attributed the 
failure of a large scale public works project in the Philippines to its 
temporary nature, despite the fact that it qenerated employment for an 44 estimated 12 percent of the national unemployment at the time. 
Nattrass argues that permanent jobs must be created if job creation 
45 
programs are to yield "a positive contribution to development". 
Similarly, the government stipulated that public works projects must not 
46 
show an economic return. This runs oounter to a fundamental principle 
of development economics that "projects selected must have a high 
47 
economic return to cost". Returns in this sense refer to forward 
linkages, for example the payment of a wage that will stimulate qrowth 
by qenerating demand for goods and services. 
Evidence suggests that the size of a public works program is critical in 
10. 
determining the likelihood of success. After reviewing public works 
proqrams world wide, Abedian and Standish conclude that one reason why 
such ventures frequently fail is that they are "trivial" and not "scaled 
to the needs of the economy". They estimate that between 14 and 16 
percent of South Africa's national budget would have to be spent to 
finance a package of public works programs with the potential to 
"initially halt and ultimately reverse the cycle of black poverty" in 
49 
the country. 
It is axiomatic that people who are not offered any real incentive to 
work on a public works program will be reluctant to participate. 
Incentives may take the form of a living wage, the opportunity to learn 
new skills, or the construction of community assets and resources to 
which contributors will have access. Few of the projects offered any 
such incentives. 
The daily 'allowance' is nothing but an attempt to fool people into 
believinq that they are 'employed' . A family of six Africans supported 
by a single breadwinner enqaqed on a public works project in 1987 would 
have survived on approximately R88 per month - R386 less than the 
household subsistence level (HSL).
5
" Seen in this liqht, comments such 
as the 'allowance' is sufficient to "keep body and soul toqether" 
and that it will have a beneficial "ripple effect ... in reqard to 
next-of-kin"
51
 are preposterous. (Furthermore, the latter statement 
contradicts the government's self-imposed principle that public works 
projects should not show an economic return.) Four rand divided between 
a family of six would provide each member with one glass of milk, a few 
slices of bread and one medium sized potato. 
Nor have efforts been made to teach skills. On the contrary, a 
consultant to a road construction scheme in rural Natal recommended 
that, rather than initiatinq projects with educational value and skills 
learning experience, activities should be kept as "simple as possible" 
52 
to reduce the educational requirements of the supervisory staff. 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), in its evaluation of the 
job creation proqrams, surprisinqly played down the role of what it 
termed "the learning component". Rather, the DBSA stressed the value of 
"work discipline" over the acquisition of "rudimentary skills".
5 3 
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The initiation of projects without consultation with local communities 
and the failure to link projects to felt needs and general development 
is another major drawback and has drawn sharp comment. For example, John 
Pohl, Executive Director of the Natal Chamber of Industries remarked in 
response to the grass and bush clearing exercises sponsored by the 
Durban City's Parks and Gardens Department: 
"Is it really necessary that we ensure that no weeds 
grow on the verges? Even if we clear them they are 
going to grow again. We find that we get to the stage 
where we are doing only cosmetic things when there are 
known needs in the community: like the Inanda water 
pipeline and also a railway line from Durban to 
Inanda."
5 4 
A good example of a project unrelated to basic community needs was the 
canalization of Baynes Spruit near Pietermartizburg. The project was 
allocated R] 356 000 and at the time of its inception in 1986 was the 
largest relief project in the country employing an estimated 1 700 
people. The object of the project was to reclaim swamp land for an 
outdoor recreational and sporting complex by constructing a ten metre 
wide canal to divert flood waters. According to Bromberger and Bhamjee 
considerable support was given to the project by residents of Scbantu -
an adjacent township.
5
® Notwithstanding the dearth of recreational 
resources in black townships, the reclamation of swamp land (which is 
technically a recreational resource in its own right) for a formal 
complex can hardly be construed a priority. Perhaps the Pietermaritzburg 
project co-ordinating committee had in mind the "give them sport in 
times of crisis" theorem. 
Itie nature of the projects also drew critical comment from respondents 
in a survey of workers in the informal sector carried out by the 
author. Several respondents described them as "women's work" and added 
that "men are just unwilling to perform this work". (Bromberger and 
Bhamjee estimate that nearly 60 percent of participants on the Baynes 
58 
Spruit project were women. ) Thus, the general failure of projects to 
attract young unemployed males cannot be solely attributed to "the 
relatively small allowance" and "work shyness ... which makes them avoid 59 hard physical labour", as suggested by one analyst, but rather to a 
12. 
general failure to implement a tailored package to meet the needs of 
60 
specific groups. 
Finally, unemployment and poverty are political problems which reflect 
government ideology and its concern for affected groups. Political 
factors are crucial in determining popular acceptance of any program and 
hence its chance of success. Of course, programs that reinforce 
apartheid have long ceased to have any chance of success. However, the 
level of politicization among black people is such that the government 
must now totally divorce itself institutionally from its own initiatives 
if they are to achieve results - and this includes surrogates such as 
the reviled community council system. It was alleged in parliament 
during 1987 for example, that R268 000 for job creation projects in Port 
Elizabeth had been misappropriated by township councillors to build 
themselves homes. Threats made by the Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Planning "to reallocate money earmarked for job creation 
6? 
in unrest areas to peaceful areas" " is further indicative of the 
Government's inability to grasp this fundamental point. 
'Itie government's willingness to use employment creation funds to contain 
'unrest' was demonstrated by the appropriation of R35 million for the 
training of community policemen.
63
 This money was part of R60 million 
allocated in 1985 to public works projects in black urban areas under 
the guidance of the Department of Constitutional Development and 
Planninq. Community policemen are deployed as auxiliary police forces 
throughout urban townships. Allegations of misconduct and lack of 
professionalism have accompanied the appointment of these personnel. 
Helen Suzman, Progressive Federal Party (PFP) spokesperson on Law and 
Order, has accused elements of these forces, popularly referred to as 
'kitskonstables', 'blackjacks', and 'greenflies', of "intimidating and 
terrorizing residents of black townships and of reqarding themselves 
64 
above the law". Recruits tend to be drawn from rural areas at the 
center of the worst excesses of poverty where any offer of formal 
employment is grasped. In this sense they represent, in the words of the 
qeneral secretary of the South African Black Municipal and Allied 
Workers Union, "the starving who are controlled by their stomachs".
6
^ 
Moreover, they are qenerally poorly educated and politically conser-
vative and have become willinq allies in the crusade against 'criminals' 
(i.e., the state's definition of political dissidents). 
13. 
The private sector has also been involved in employment creation 
projects but, not unexpectedly, abuses have accompanied their involve-
ment. Evidence of firms applying for subsidized labour after beinci 
awarded tender contracts was presented in parliament during 1986. By 
building the full cost of labour into their tender and then successfully 
applying for a subsidy to cover these costs several companies have been 
able to pocket the full cost of labour as "unearned windfall profits" 
while paying their workers either a R3 or R4 daily 'allowance' . At the 
same time it was alleged that farmers in certain districts were 
receiving money from funds provided for the job creation program c.n 
68 
condition that they did not dismiss any of their workers. While abuses 
such as these are perpetrated, job creation programs, far from rrakinq 
positive contributions, merely generate political mistrust. 
There is certainly little evidence to support claims that the iob 
creation program has been a "phenomenal success" as suqqested by the 
Minister of Education and Development Aid.
6 9
 On the contrary, the 
program has been a dismal failure: the pitiful 'allowance', the failure 
to target projects towards specific groups, the selection of projects 
which do not impart skills or provide poorer communities with tr.uch 
needed resources, the channelling of monies into schemes that divide 
communities, and private sector abuses, can hardly be construed as 
'success' . 
Training the Unemployed 
"... an aspiring typist could progress within a 
period of a mere three weeks to a point where she at 
least has a passable knowledge of a word processor, 
even though she cannot operate it expertly. She at 
least knows how a telex machine works as well. This 
is the kind of training that is given." 
70 
J. J. Lloyd, MP (National Party), 1986 
In terms of this strategy the government has allocated funds for the 
training, or retraining, of unemployed persons. Between April 1985 and 
30 June 1987 585 524 people received basic skills training.
7 1
 The train-
ing of unemployed persons is largely subcontracted to private enter-
14. 
prises who are reimbursed R22 per day per course participant. People 
over 18 years of age undergoing training receive a daily allowance of 
R2.40 (16 - 18 year olds receive R1.80) plus one meal per day and 
reimbursment of their public transport costs. The courses are short 
term, running from one to five weeks, and cover 180 skills from domestic 
service to business management and from builders' assistants to computer 
li teracy. 
A number of mechanisms operate to exclude the poor and uneducated from 
this training scheme. First, information about the program has not been 
widely disseminated. For example, 40 percent of respondents in my survey 
of informal sector workers had not heard of either the job creation or 
training schemes. This is certainly tied to the fact that potential 
participants in training courses are notified through regional labour 
bureaux. 'Itiis effectively means that they must either be registered as a 
job seeker or frequently visit a bureau. 
Few people in fact bother to register with labour bureaux - in August 
1985 when over five million Africans were estimated to be unemployed, 
only 52 984 (excluding those in the 'independent' bantustans) were 
registered. Reasons for this reluctance to register are not hard to 
find. One reason is intimidation by labour bureau officials. For example 
one person in my survey claimed an official told him "not to hang around 
aimlessly because you know there is no work". Research into the 
administrative practices of labour bureaux supports this argument. 
Sarakinsky and Keenan in fact suqqest that: 
" as absolute unemployment becomes greater,, a 
relatively smaller proportion of the black unemployed 
bother to register at labour bureaux as they realize 
there is little or no chance of getting work. Conse-
quently, there tends to be an inverse relationship 
between the real level of unemployment and the level 
72 of unemployment as recorded by the government." 
Second, prospective course participants are screened to assess course 
suitability. In this regard suitability correlates closely with 
education and past work experience. While a spokesperson for the Natal 
Institute of Training assured me that the majority of the 60 courses run 
15. 
by the Institute assumed only three years of primary schoolinq, it is 
difficult to imagine the type of course for which a functional 
illiterate with no previous work experience is eligible and which will 
realistically improve employment prospects. A one to three week course 
can only, at best, marginally increase marketable skills, and certainly 
not in the type of jobs for which there is great demand. If by chance a 
vacancy does occur an army of unemployed are lined up in competition. 
In September 1987 the government estimated that only 25 percent of those 
73 
who had enrolled in a training course had found work (one wonders 
whether this figure includes community policemen?), although the 
Minister of Manpower is optimistic that "a large percentage of the 
others would find employment within a reasonable period".
7 4
 The basis of 
his optimism was never explained nor did he define what he considered to 
be a reasonable time. 
The government has consistently glossed over problems associated with 
training programs. For example, one member of the NMC dismissed the 
effects of continued unemployment on newly trained people with an array 
of flawed arguments such as: "skills ... improved the long-term 
employability of the trainees" (emphasis added): "even if skills are 
temporarily lost, experience has taught that they are acquired again 
relatively easily with a refresher course at a later stage" (one wonders 
whether the government will consider offerinq two day refresher courses 
every x months to people who completed three week courses but remain 
unemployed!); and, "even if persons cannot be placed after training, 
training in job-search technigues has some value".
7
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The only conclusion that can be drawn from such statements is that the 
unemployed are supposed to gain some form of gratification from the 
knowledge that the qovernment has attempted to alleviate their pliqht, 
regardless of actual achievements. Accordinq to the DBSA this was in 
fact one of the quidinq principles of the job creation proqram: "to 
demonstrate the qovernment to be a concerned qovernment, i.e., 'one that 
cares' ."
7 6
 As one member claimed durinq a parliamentary debate: "We 
are also teachinq people in other ways. It not only concerns their 
standard of livinq but also the quality of life."
7 7
 Later in the same 
debate the Minister of Manpower explained how job training improved the 
guality of life: 
16. 
"One sees there (at the training center) how a person 
undergoes a metamorphosis and how a person changes 
there within three weeks from a person who is really 
down and out, into a person who has self-respect and 
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optimism again, and perhaps acquires a certificate ..." 
One is forcefully reminded here of the crudely explicit class tones of 
South Africa's approach to black 'development' . The poor are required 
to be content with a standard of subsistence that neither threatens a 
radical redistribution of wealth, nor attempts to challenqe the 
structures of political domination and economic exploitation. Of course, 
this approach is never overtly pushed in a society which is trying to 
sell itself as being based on equal opportunity. 
Against this background it is not surprising to learn that those gaining 
most from this program are the some 200 private training institutions 
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throughout South Africa sub-contracted to run courses during 1986. It 
is alleged, for example, that one company had grossed more than R3 
80 
million from the scheme by April 1986. Profits are substantially 
increased where courses rely on cheap video tapes and recycled training 
equipment and materials. 
Private companies using the program to train elements of their 
workforces at subsidized rates are the other main beneficiaries. A 
company requirinq staff can select employees throuqh a labour bureau and 
have them trained at government expense. AECI (Bethal) for example, 
employed "probationary labourers" throuqh the program to reduce the 
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"risks and costs of hiring and retrenchment". The DBSA viewed such 
practices favourably which it said would "enable employers to identify 
the best workers". The Bank contended that this was particularly 
important where minimum wages are high; as for example at AECI where the 82 
minimum wage for a labourer is R500 per month. 
In conclusion, serious reservations must be expressed about the 
viability of any project that can only claim to be 25 percent 
successful, particularly when the main beneficiaries are not those for 
whom the project was designed. 
17. 
Developing the Informal Sector 
"As most reasonable people know ... the small busi-
ness and informal sectors have proved worldwide to 
be the most efficient job creators." 
8 3 
Ben Vosloo (Managing Director, SBDC) 
Throughout the world, but concentrated in third world cities, people 
engage in what are imprecisely referred to as 'informal' employment 
activities. Broadly, informal activities are distinguished from those in 
the formal sector by their small scale and labour intensive operations, 
ease of entry, adapted technology and indigenous resources, skills 
acquired outside formal institutions, and unregulated and competitive 
markets. Examples of informal activities include backyard mechanics and 
carpenters, hawkers, 'pirate' taxidrivers, shoeshiners, cardboard 
collectors, carparkers and prostitutes. T'he heterogeneous nature of the 
informal sector includes not only the wide range of activates in 
manufacturing, retailing and services, but also diversification in terms 
of productivity, income levels and the motivations of participants. 
These factors suggest that the informal sector is stratified with the 
upper echelons characterised by the accumulation of wealth and the lower 
84 by subsistence returns. 
The latter point is particularly crucial here because in South Africa 
the state's approach to the informal sector mirrors the social accep-
tability of the different segments. Not surprisinqly, the favoured 
sectors, which Rogerson recently identified as small scale manufac-
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turing, the shebeen (tavern) trade and street trading, are those 
conceptualized in terms of wealth and employment generation rather than 
survival strategies and where the participants are defined as dynamic 
entrepreneurs rather than wage-labourers-in-waiting. The strateqic 
advantaqes of such a conceptualization should not be underestimated: on 
the one hand, it relieves the government of its responsibility to 
provide welfare assistance; and on the other, it enables the government 
to define elements that do not fit the stereotype imaqe as nuisances to 
be harassed, prosecuted and banished. 
Informal sector operators themselves reqard offical harassment as their 
18. 
greatest bane. There is little doubt that the repression of the informal 
sector is entrenched in certain state apparatuses, notably the police 
and local authorities. In Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria, for 
example, recent campaigns have been conducted against informal sector 
operators on the basis of their alleged criminal tendencies and their 
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perceived threats to tourism. Research in South Africa indicates that 
approximately 40 percent of informal sector participants see police and 
8 7 
local authority harassment as a major problem. Harassment by local 
authorites and the police lends credence to the argument that government 
policy can be effectively undermined by the actions of stronger interest 
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groups: the government's agenda for the informal sector is not 
necessarily compatible with that of the local authority. 
For those favoured segments of the South African informal sector, 
numerous strategies have been proposed to assist their 'development', 
but two of these, the removal, or relaxation, of restrictive legislation 
and the provision of working capital, are particularly pertinent. 
It is said that the documents applicable to a person setting up a 
factory "stand five feet high" and that to understand all the, often 
contradictory, red tape which confronts businessmen at every turn would 
89 
reguire a lifetime of work. The FMF has in fact identified over 
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1 000 legal impediments to informal sector operations. Although the 
State President is empowered under the TRREA Act to suspend legislation 
which impedes economic progress government officials recently conceded 
that Botha's extra powers are "essentially a symbolic commitment to 
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deregulation". One year after the TRREA Act was passed.it remained 
unused. 
The provision of working capital for participants in the informal sector 
is based on three myths. The first is that informal sector operators are 
burgeoning dynamic entrepreneurs. As argued above such a label is 
politically expedient. Empirical studies repeatedly demonstrate that the 
majority of participants view their plight as a temporary survival 
strategy, in the absence of unemployment benefits and state sponsored 
welfare aid, while seeking formal wage employment. Tn this context, 
participants make up those portions of the surplus labour force who 
cannot find formal wage employment under capitalism and therefore 
survive on subsistence earnings procured by menial tasks. 
The second can be coined the myth of success. Accordinq to this 
myth the door to success is open to anybody prepared to work hard while 
failure is ascribed to personal deficiencies. The media in South Africa 
constantly reinforce this myth with case studies of people who have 
'made it' in the informal sector and transcended the bridqe to the 
formal sector. For example: "Max has it made on beer bottle sales". 
Business Day, 23/7/86 (tells the life story of Max Tlakula who made his 
fortune oollectinq and sellinq beer bottles): and, "How Fats became a 
businessman", The Star, 17/10/86 (describes how perserverance and a loan 
from the SBDC enabled 'Fats' Thabane to establish a flourishinq car wash 
92 
business ). These stories invariably romanticize the informal sector: 
"They are mostly unemployed and poor but they have qrit, and like 
chickens which peck a survival out of the dust have improvised manv 9 3 
inqenious ways of scrappinq toqether an income." 
Consistent with these myths has been the creation of special institu-
tions to provide loans to small operators. Despite their rhetoric, how-
ever, banks and the various parastatals remain prejudiced aqainst small 
operators who neither keep accurate records of their financial 
activities nor have thorouqhly researched their potential for expansion. 
For example, while one of the stated objectives of Afribank is to aid 
small businesses, a spokesperson has pointed out that it can do nothinq 
94 
for those who do not "think and act biq". Thus, very few operators in 
the informal sector can approach creditors with confidence and certainly 
none that operate at the subsistence level. Kriqe in fact arques that 
the SBDC does "little to promote the interests of the informal sector" 
and her research into its lendinq policy revealed that the SBDC selects 
clients based on their potetial for accumulation rather than those 95 
operating at subsistence level. Da Silva concurs. She concluded that 
the SBDC is "geared towards helping already established and prospering 
businesses rather than to promoting new enterprise development".^
6 
The allocation of loans by the SBDC for the 1984/85 financial year 
testifies to these arguments. While empirical evidence suggests most 
small operators reguire loans of less than R200 the SBDC lent out only 
R1.4 million under the infant enterprises scheme which provides 'mini-
loans' of up to R2 000 repayable over 24 months. This compared with R2.7 
million lent out under the comprehensive assistance scheme (loans of up 
to R30 000), and R22 million under the general financing scheme (loans 
of up to R300 000). The SBDC also acts as quarantor for selected clients 
who secure bank loans. Tn the year under consideration the SBDC 
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idemnified loans worth R13 million. 
Any development organization which assists the smallest and weakest of 
businesses must expect to incur losses. However, this is contrary to 
SBDC policy. The SBDC calculates that between 1981 and the end of the 
1988/89 financial year its bad debts will amount to R29.7 million, or 
6.8 percent, of total loans of R436 million. Accordinq to Ben Vosloo, 
the SBDC will cease operatinq if bad debts total more than five percent 
of loans. He predicted that stricter criteria will be imposed on appli-
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cants and fewer loans approved in the future. 
Not only are qovernment and parastatal officials biased aqainst small 
business operators on ideoloqical qrounds but because of their social 
distance from the real life situation of prospective loan applicants 
they are patently unaware of the applicant's circumstances and conse-
quently are ill-equipped to provide aid. Amonq the related inadequacies 
of the SBDC noted by Kriqe are: loan repayments are expected to be made 
by cheque when banks are virtually non-existent in black areas, 
particularly in the bantustans, and cheque accounts are alien to most 
black people: the SBDC does not employ sufficient full-time inter-
preters: the inability to monitor loans has resulted in a tendency to 
award loans for the purchase of capital equipment rather than workinq 
capital; SBDC offices are often located away from the main public 
transport routes: and, assistance is directed towards production in the 
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manufacturinq sector. This latter point is particularly pertinent in 
the South African situation where the majority of informal sector 
activities involve a recycling of qoods in the retail sector.'®
0 
The third myth of the informal sector is its capacity for qeneratinq 
employment. This is closely related to the fallacy that it consists 
primarily of manufacturinq activities. On the contrary, most informal 
businesses are one person shows. Nattrass and Glass found that 63 
percent of informal sector businesses in Durban are manaqed by one 
person and that employment capacity correlates stronqly with capital 
employed.
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 Not surprisingly, in the lower echelons of the informal 
sector there are few employment generation prospects. Nattrass and Glass 
in fact offer the following sobering conclusion for those who place hiqh 
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hopes on the employment prospects of the informal sector: "(it) is not 
at present a major source of wage employment, nor within the present 
,,102 
environment does it seem likely to develop into one as it grows. 
The basic limitation of the government's 'new deal' for the informal 
sector is guite clear: it ignores the stratified structure ol the 
informal sector. Of course, this misconception enables the government to 
justify a redefinition of the overwhelming majority of participants, 
those who survive in the dungeons of the informal sector on the i ore 
that one day they will "get lucky" and secure formal employment, as 
radical lumpen elements. 
DEFINING THE 'SUCCESS' OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION STRATEGIES 
In the period between the publication of the government's White Paier, A 
Strategy for the Creation of Employment Opportunities, in 1984 and the 
presentation of the 1987/88 budget in June 1987 the effects of black 
unemployment were widely discussed in South Africa. In view of the 
state's history of intransigence towards this problem, the nuestior 
posed here is, why was the apparent concern for black unemployment 
expressed at that specific conjuncture? The answer had nothing to do 
with any sense of altruism for the burgeoning unemployed black community 
and the excesses of poverty which accompany unemployment in a non-
welfare state, rather with a fear that this faction was fanning the 
flames of 'revolution' . 
Government debates are littered with references linking unemloyment 
to 'revolution' . Not unexpectedly, the Minister of Manpower is at the 
fore in expressing this view: "I realize the extent of the revolutionary 
onslaught against us. I also realize what a breeding ground unemployed 
degraded people are for revolution, and that is why I am helping them. 
We are acting in the interests of South Africa."'
0 3
 Likewise, the 
Minister of Law and Order blames "overseas action, unemployment, and the 
conduct of revolutionaries ..." for the state of emergency.^"'' These 
sentiments have also been expressed by opposition members to the left of 
the government. For example, Messrs Savaqe and Malcomess of the PFP have 
both referred to unemployment as a cause of political violence in Port 
Elizabeth: "Unemployment rises: violence escalates: no growth takes 
place: unemployment rises again: people have nothing to do, and con-
22. 
frontation becomes increasingly violent in an inescapable circle."
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Nor have these viewpoints been confined to members of parliament. Vested 
interests, including parastatals, business lobbies, bantustan leaders 
and municipal councils have all issued their own warnings. Ben Vosloo, 
for example, has argued that "South Africa could expect black urban 
residents to become a destabilizing factor in society if they were 
denied new business and job opportunities in the future".
1 0 6
 Andrew 
Hamilton of the Natal Chamber of Industries believes that "blacks have 
to be brought into the system of free enterprise as soon as possible -
unlike the pattern in the territories to the north - otherwise they will 
fall prey to socialist ideals ... "
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 Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister 
of the KwaZulu bantustan, warns that the free enterprise system has 
already been placed "under siege by militant trade unions and radical 
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extremists." (Of course, these spokespersons conveniently forget that 
blacks responded positively to the free enterprise system in the 
nineteenth century prior to the curtailment of opportunity by reams of 
legislation.) Even seemingly innocuous institutions like the Durban City 
Enaineer's Department have made cautious statements: "The inability to 
provide at least some basic services, and thus promote 'well being' 109 could lead to the manifestation of social unrest." 
Likewise the media lias echoed related viewpoints, warning of the conse-
quences of "desperate" unemployed workers who roam 'white' cities in 
search ot work (e.g., "Desperate men fiqht for jobs". City Press, 
13/4/86: "Unemployment a sorry story", Business Day, 9/5/86; "Beachfront 
crime fears," Daily News, 18/10/86: "Desperate wait for work", The Natal 
Mercury, 18/3/87; and, "Beachfront is a danqer zone", Daily News, 
14/9/87). 
The pronounced 'success' of the job creation and training programs and 
the 'new deal ' for the informal sector should not be interpreted as 
being related to either a reduction in the total numbers of unemployed 
or the provision of welfare aid to relieve the misery of unemployment. 
The failure of the economic relief packages to adequately address these 
problems has been well noted. Rather, the concept of 'success' has been 
measured in terms of counterinq what is referred to as "the total 
onslaught" directed against the country. This is reflected in the 
pronouncements of members of parliament. The Minister of Manpower, for 
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example, has noted the "anti-revolutionary" contributions of training 
centres on numerous occasions: 
"Many of those people (African women being trained as 
domestic servants) had not worked before or had not 
had any real contact with other population groups. 
Thanks to the contact which takes place there (in the 
training center), an attitude and a point of contact 
is created which is anti-revolutionary."^^ 
National Party MP Dr M. H. Veldman similarly described his visit to a 
training center: 
"What an experience! What does one see there? 1 will 
first tell you what I did not see there. I did not 
see a single clenched fist: only people who were busy 
as bees during the training ... Everybody was inter-
ested, friendly and eager to carry out their tasks." 
During the 1987/88 Manpower Vote the Minister of Manpower in fact 
concluded: 
'"This department and I were responsible for the iob 
creation and training proqram under which more than 
R1 000 million was spent over the past two years. 
When I think of success stories and achievements, I 
cannot recall a greater success story than the iob 
creation and training program launched by the govern-
ment. I want to state categorically today that the 
single factor which had the greatest counterrevolu-
tionary effect in South Africa was this job creation 
112 and training program. It kept idle people busy." • 
The idea that a three week training course can somehow miraculously 
transform an "unskilled, degraded and dispirited person" (i.e., a 
'revolutionary') as the Minister of Mancower believes,'^
3
 is as absurd 
as the myth that millions of unemployed people doubly oppressed by 
apartheid are themselves to blame for their predicament. Incredible as 
this sounds, it is a popular contention in qovernment circles. 
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The government has not subjected its fallacious logic to an analysis 
because the myth of the radical unemployed has enormous appeal and 
political expedience. Once the parallel between the increase in 
unemployment and an upsurge in political violence had been drawn any 
strategy which reduced the latter (in this case the state of emergency) 
was obviously going to be misconstrued as havinq had positive effects on 
unemployment per se. However, the incongruity of tackling unemployment 
by overt and covert repression under the guise of a state of emergency 
was not lost on the government. Enter the economic relief packages, with 
all their positive connotations for black 'development' and 'uplift-
ment', and the government had a politically acceptable policy to tackle 
unemployment. The fact that this policy was economically ill-founded was 
irrelevant in relation to the real issue - containing resistance and 
ultimately retaininq power. 
Evidence to support this argument can be gleaned from the state's 
utterances and actions. Tn its evaluation of the relief measures, the 
DBSA stressed that the programs were "not intended to show an economic 
return (but) were designed to serve the public interest in some other 
way. In terms of socio-psycho-political factors the program must be 
regarded as having been efficiently implemented."
1 1 4
 It was no 
coincidence that the relief measures were slashed at precisely the same 
time as the government was declaring the state of emergency a success. 
Here 'success' is defined in terms of a docile quiescent black 
population. At the opening of the fourth parliament in 1987, the State 
President said: "The correctness of imposing a nationwide state of 
emergency has been substantiated by the decline in the occurrence of 
incidents of unrest since the middle of last year." Later he said: "When 
we announced a state of emergency ... we restored normal conditions. 
Black people went back to work. Black pupils went back to school. Black 
people could live in their houses again."
1 1 5
 By the end of 1987 Botha 
was describing South Africa as a "symbol of peace".
1 1 6
 However, when the 
government announced in the 1987/88 budget that assistance to the 
unemployed was being "reduced" the justifications were not, of course, 
attributed to the effects of the state of emergency but to an imaginary 
"turn in the economic tide towards growth and development".
1 1 7 
Any concern the South African government appears to have shown for the 
welfare of black workers, including unemployed fractions, evaporates in 
25. 
the face of repressive labour legislation such as the Labour Relations 
Amendment Bill, privatization and deregulation strategies, the detention 
and harassment of union officials, the banning of union meetings and 
the frustration of attempts by unemployed workers to organize and 
mobilize. 
The state has clearly identified with capital to repress workers. The 
Labour Relations Amendment Bill was introduced after the National Union 
of Mineworkers' strike in August 1987, despite the Chamber of Mines 
affirming the adeguacy of existing labour laws. Tn terms of the bill: 
sympathy strikes will become illegal; employers will be able to 
interdict strikes; any claim to sole collective bargaining rights may be 
defined as an unfair labour practice (thus encouraging 'sweetheart' and 
racial unions); employers are entitled to sue unions for damage caused 
by illegal strikes: boycotts are defined as unfair labour practices for 
which employers will be able to claim damages: employers will be allowed 
to selectively re-employ workers after a strike: and, industrial 
disputes on any single issue cannot be declared more than once in a 15 
month period. 
Privatization and deregulation are government strategies designed to 
stimulate economic growth and reduce unemployment. However, within these 
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strategies trade unions, minimum wages, and health and safety regula-
tions are defined as obstructions to the creation of new business. To 
remove these 'obstructions' the government intends establishing 
"industrial centers" in which crucial provisions of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment and the Machinery and Occupational Safety acts are 
removed. For example, restrictions relating to waqe rates, overtime work 
and pay, shift work, work on Sundays and public holiday, notice of 
termination and conditions of safety such as proper ventilation and the 
provision of protective clothing for workers engaged in hazardous tasks 119 are all suspended in the industrial centres. 
The repression of workers and the unemployed has been facilitated by the 
reorganization of the interna! security apparatus under the auspices of 
the National Security Management System (NSMS). The building blocks of 
the NSMS are Joint Management Centers (JMC's). The NSMS acts as a shadow 
state structure, to co-ordinate strategies dealing with security 
problems. Potential 'security' issues have been redefined to include 
welfare ooncerns on the assumption that "people who don't lead decent 
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lives are goinq to riot". This assumption is remarkably consistent 
with the myth of the radical unemployed. While information about the 
operation of the NSMS is sketchy (the State President has confirmed that 1 21 
"the operation of the system will not be made public" ) some details 
have emerged. Accordinq to Mr James Selfe, a researcher for the PFP, the 
Cape Town JMC intervened when it perceived that the Atlantis Residents' 
Association constituted a "local threat". Selfe said the JMC "orqanized 
food parcels for the hunqry and soccer tours for the children ... and 
ensured that local politicans in the formal system (i.e., township 
councillors) were qiven the credit". "But", he added, "it was simply a 
1 22 front." Interestinqly, the DBSA suqqested that the JMC system should 
have been "used to a greater extent in determining the needs and 
123 priorities" of the employment creation program" (emphasis added). 
The apartheid regime's survival is inextricably linked to the 
propagation of myths, including that which defines black unemployed 
workers and lumpen elements as radicals. When this propaganda fails the 
state resorts to coercion and repression. These are the truths of South 
Africa today. 
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